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LEGISLATIVE COMMENTS
THE QUESTIONABLE VALIDITY OF THE AUTOMATIC
EXEMPTION OF ATTORNEYS FROM JURY SERVICE
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 10, 1980 Senator Emick proposed a bill' in the Virginia
General Assembly to abolish the automatic2 and optional exemptions
1. S.B.70, Va. Reg. Sess. (1980).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (current version at § 8.01-341 (Cum. Supp.
1980)) provided certain occupational classes with an automatic exemption from jury service.
This section read as follows:
The following shall be exempt from serving on juries in civil and criminal cases:
1. The President and Vice-President of the United States,
2. The Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth,
3. The members of both houses of Congress and their respective officers,
4. The members of the General Assembly,
5. Licensed practicing attorneys,
6. Licensed practicing physicians,
7. Licensed practicing optometrists,
8. Licensed practicing dentists,
9. Officers of any court, provided such officers are in actual service as such and
receive compensation therefor,
10-13. [Repealed],
14. The clerks of both houses of the General Assembly,
15. The judge of any court and members of the State Corporation Commission,
16. All ministers of the gospel licensed to preach according to the rules of their
sect,
17. Sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, State Police, and police and magistrates in coun-
ties, cities and towns,
18. [Repealed],
19. Keepers of the jails of counties, cities and towns,
20. Superintendents and employees of public hospitals and mental hospitals,
21. The superintendent of the penitentiary and his assistants and the persons
composing the guard,
22,23. [Repealed],
24. Undertakers who pay a license tax as such, and their regularly employed
assistants,
25. Persons on active duty with the armed forces of the United States or the
Commonwealth,
26, 27. [Repealed],
28. All persons who hold certificates to practice and are practicing veterinary
medicine or surgery,
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from jury service of persons engaged in certain occupations. The bill was
not passed in its proposed form.4 Section 8.01-341.1, providing optional
exemptions, still remains in force in its entirety.5 Automatic exemptions,
however, were eliminated for optometrists, clerks of both houses of the
General Assembly, ministers, jail keepers, superintendents of public and
mental hospitals, undertakers, veterinarians, members of fire depart-
ments, pharmacists, clinical psychologists and citizens of Broad Water
29. Regularly employed members of any fire department of any political subdi-
vision or governmental agency,
30. Registered pharmacists while engaged in the practice of their profession.
The citizens of Tangier Island in Accomack County and of Broad Water and
Cobb Islands in the county of Northampton shall be exempt from jury service, ex-
cept service on grand juries.
Section 8.01-341 as cited above is the amended form of § 8-208.6 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Section 8-208.6 provided automatic exemptions for all the occupational classes which are
now specified in § 8.01-341.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977) as optional exemptions. See note 3 infra. The
1978 VA. AcTs cc. 176 and 340 deleted "and employees" following "Superintendents" in
subdivision 20 in § 8.01-341 and added a subdivision which exempted licensed practicing
clinical psychologists.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides certain occupational classes with
an exemption from jury service if they claim it. This section reads as follows:
The following may claim exemptions from serving on juries in civil and criminal
cases:
1. Train dispatchers and trainmen employed in train service,
2. Maritime and commercial airline pilots licensed under the laws of the United
States or this State,
3. Customhouse officers,
4. Mariners actually employed in maritime service,
5. All persons while actually engaged in harvesting or securing grain, fruit, pota-
toes or hay or in harvesting or securing tobacco, and, during the tobacco marketing
season at any tobacco warehouse, warehousemen and persons employed at such
warehouse or engaged in purchasing or handling of tobacco thereat,
6. All professors, tutors and pupils of public or private institutions of learning,
while such institutions are actually in session,
7. Ferrymen actually employed in that capacity,
8. A person who has legal custody of and is necessarily and personally responsi-
ble for a child or children sixteen years of age or younger requiring continuous care
by him during normal court hours,
9. A person who is necessarily and personally responsible for a person having a
physical or mental impairment requiring continuous care by him during normal
court hours,
10. Any person over seventy years of age,
11. Any person whose spouse is summoned to serve on the same jury panel.
4. Senator Emick's proposed bill read as follows: "§ 8.01-341. Exemptions from jury ser-
vice.-Except as otherwise provided in this article [disqualifications and excuses of jurors]
no qualified prospective juror is exempt from jury service." S.B.70, Va. Reg. Sess. (1980).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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and Cobb Islands.e Licensed practicing attorneys, however, along with
several other occupational classes, remain automatically exempt from jury
service. Consequently, they are not considered as prospective jurors when
the master jury list is compiled.7
This comment will focus on why attorneys traditionally have been ex-
empt from jury service and whether this exemption violates the fair cross-
section principle for jury selection procedures as established by the Su-
preme Court.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAiR CROSS-SECTION PRINCIPLE
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees an
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341 (Cum. Supp. 1980) now reads:
The following shall be exempt from serving on juries in civil and criminal cases:
1. The President and Vice-President of the United States,
2. The Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth,
3. The members of both houses of Congress,
4. The members of the General Assembly, while in session,
5. Licensed practicing attorneys,
6. Licensed practicing physicians,
7. [Repealed.]
8. Lidensed practicing dentists,
9. Officers of any court, provided such officers are in actual service as such and
receive compensation therefor,
10-14. [Repealed.]
15. The judge of any court and members of the State Corporate Commission,
16. [Repealed.]
17. Sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, State Police, and police and magistrates in counties,
cities and towns,
18-20. [Repealed.]
21. The superintendent of the penitentiary and his assistants and the persons
composing the guard,
22-24. [Repealed.]
25. Persons on active duty with the armed forces of the United States or the
Commonwealth,
26-31. [Repealed.]
The citizens of Tangier Island in Accomack County shall be exempt from jury ser-
vice, except service on grand juries.
The amendments were approved by Governor Dalton on April 2, 1979 and became effective
July 1, 1980.
7. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-345 to -352 (Repl. Vol. 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1980) prescribe the
juror selection process in Virginia. A random selection technique is utilized whereby names
are either mechanically or electronically selected, primarily from a current voter registration
list. Questionnaires are then mailed to all persons selected, requesting their occupation,
among other information. Upon receipt of the questionnaire, the jury commissioners apply
the statutory exemptions specified in § 8.01-341 to the names selected.
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accused in a criminal trial the right to trial by an "impartial jury."8 The
breath of this guarantee was not defined by the Supreme Court until pas-
sage of the fourteenth amendment in 1868.9 Since 1868, the Supreme
Court has considered several jury challenges, and in so doing, has grap-
pled with defining what constitutes impartiality in jury selection proce-
dures and the amount of evidence necessary to prove that government
officials tampered with jury panels. 10 The present interpretation of "im-
partial jury" can be traced primarily to four cases decided by the Su-
preme Court during the 1940's. It is from these decisions that the "fair
cross-section" principle, as the standard for jury selection procedures in
both federal and state courts, has evolved.
In Smith v. Texas,"' a black petitioner charged with rape, challenged
the composition of the indicting grand jury on the basis that while blacks
constituted twenty percent of the population in his community, only five
were summoned to serve over a period of seven years. In this same time
period 494 white men were summoned. In reversing the conviction, the
Supreme Court held that the use of juries as instruments of public justice
contemplates "that the jury be a body truly representative of the
community.' 2
Two years later in Glasser v. United States's petitioners alleged that
they were denied an impartial jury because the only female jurors who
were selected to serve were members of the League of Women Voters; the
views of the prosecution had been presented at League meetings on sev-
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Article I § 8 of the Constitution of Virginia also guarantees
that an accused in criminal prosecutions shall enjoy the right to trial by an "impartial jury
of his vicinage." The word "vicinage" corresponds to the territorial jurisdiction of the court
in which the venue of the crime is laid. Newberry v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 819, 823, 66
S.E.2d 841, 843 (1951).
9. Until passage of the fourteenth amendment, state governments were bound only by
their own constitutions. Consequently, relatively few civil liberties issues were generated for
appellate review in the federal courts.
10. Some of the more widely cited cases include: Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 US. 128 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880). For an extensive list of Supreme Court decisions involving jury selection see J. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES-OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE
PANELs 397 (1977).
11. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
12. Id. at 130.
13. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
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eral occasions. Although the conviction was affirmed,14 the majority
opined that a jury cannot be the organ of any one special class. For the
first time the Court used the words "a cross-section of the community" as
the standard for jury selection.15 In Ballard v. United States,16 another
case involving sex discrimination in jury selection procedures, the Court
decided that the intentional and systematic exclusion of women from jury
service, like the exclusion of a racial, economic or social group, deprives
the jury of the broad base it was designed to have. "'Such action is oper-
ative to destroy the basic democratic and classlessness of jury
personnel.' "17
The Court further developed the fair cross-section principle for federal
jury proceedings in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.' s The petitioner in
Thiel had brought suit against a railroad company for negligence. After
demanding a jury trial, the petitioner moved to strike the entire panel,
alleging that the clerk and jury commissioner of a federal district court
deliberately and intentionally excluded daily wage earners from the jury
lists, with business executives or those having the employer's view pur-
posely selected for the panel. In ordering a new trial, Justice Marshall
wrote:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with
either criminal or civil ... proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impar-
tial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.... This does not
mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the eco-
nomic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the
community; frequently such complete representation would be impossible.
But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials
without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. 19
These four cases applied the fair cross-section principle only to jury
proceedings in the federal courts. Although the sixth amendment require-
ment of trial by "impartial jury" was imposed on the states in 1968,20 it
was not until 1975 that the Supreme Court in the leading decision of
14. The petitioners in this case filed an affidavit attesting to the manner in which the jury
was selected. The prosecution did not stipulate to accept the affidavit as proof and conse-
quently the Court held that the affidavit alone was insufficient proof of jury tampering.
15. See VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 55 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 86).
16. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
17. Id. at 195.
18. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). Although Thiel is a civil case, it is widely recognized as an inte-
gral decision in the Supreme Court's development of the sixth amendment doctrine con-
cerning jury selection procedures in the federal courts.
19. Id. at 220 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
20. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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Taylor v. Louisiana21 held the fair cross-section principle applicable to
jury selection procedures in state criminal proceedings. 2 In Taylor, the
petitioner, a male, challenged the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute
which provided that a woman should not be selected for jury service un-
less she had previously filed a written declaration of her desire to be sub-
ject to jury service. Petitioner was convicted by a petit jury drawn from a
venire in which no women were listed. However, women constituted fifty-
three percent of eligible jurors in his community.23 The petitioner claimed
that he was deprived of his federal constitutional right to "'a fair trial by
jury of a representative segment of the community.' "24 In reversing the
judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanding the case for
new proceedings, Justice White wrote for the majority: "We accept the
fair cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaran-
teed by the Sixth Amendment.... Restricting jury service to only spe-
cial groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the
community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury
trial."25
It is now evident that jury selection procedures for criminal and civil
cases in federal court, and at least criminal cases in state court, must
comply with the fair cross-section principle. It must be emphasized, how-
ever, that the fair cross-section principle does not refer to the composi-
tion of each and every jury that is empaneled. The foregoing decisions
require only that the master jury list or the panel of prospective jurors
(from which actual jurors are chosen to serve) represent a fair cross-sec-
tion of the community.
III. Do OCCUPATIONAL EXEMPTIONS VIOLATE THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION
PRINCIPLE?
In deciding challenges to jury selection procedures, the Supreme Court
has focused primarily on whether a "cognizable class" or "identifiable
group" has been denied a fair share of seats on jury panels. The Court
seemed to recognize a cognizable class as including only those groups
which have been the subject of past discrimination or are susceptible to
21. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
22. Although the right to trial by jury is to be "preserved" in state civil proceedings, the
Supreme Court has not explicitly imposed the fair cross-section principle on jury selection
procedures for such civil trials. See VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 45-83.
23. Louisiana attempted to assert that the male petitioner had no standing to object to
the exclusion of women because he was not a member of the excluded class. The Court held
that there was no rule which prohibited such a challenge. 419 U.S. at 524.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 530 (emphasis added).
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general discrimination.2" For example, in Smith the Court recognized ra-
cial groups as a cognizable class. In Ballard, Glasser and Taylor, women
were recognized as a cognizable class, and in Thiel, at least some mem-
bers of the daily wage earning class were considered to be an identifiable
group. The Court has concluded that exclusion of any of these groups
"would pose a substantial threat that the remaining pool of jurors would
not be representative of the community"; 27 that is, jury venires would be'
composed of only one special or partisan class. Underlying this concern is
the fear that removal of prospective jurors on the basis of race or gender
would deprive the jury of varying qualities of human nature inherent in
these different classes.28
Yet, the Court has explicitly stated that the varying qualities of human
nature, essential to a representative jury, would not be undermined by
occupational exemptions,29 perhaps implying that members of an ex-
cluded occupational class do not constitute a cognizable group.
In Rawlins v. Georgia,30 a petitioner challenged his indictment by a
grand jury which was chosen from a jury list that excluded doctors, minis-
ters, lawyers, engineers, dentists and many other occupational classes,
most of which are exempt in the majority of states today. 1 In rejecting
petitioner's challenge, the Court expressly held that since the exclusion
was not the result of race or class prejudice "[t]he nature of the classes
excluded was not such as was likely to affect the conduct of the members
as jurymen, or to make them act otherwise than those who were drawn
would act."8 2 The Court went on to say that "[a] state [could] ... ex-
-cude certain classes on the bona fide ground that it was for the good of
the community that their regular work. . . not be interrupted .... "88
26. See VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 51. It is Mr. Van Dyke's contention that the Court
has thus far only interfered with selection procedures that perpetuate the inequities of our
society and that underrepresent the poor, nonwhites, women, the young and the elderly. Id.
27. 419 U.S. at 534.
28. See id. at 537; Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-04 (1972); Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946).
29. But see 419 U.S. at 542 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist criticizes the
majority's position that occupational exemptions do not rob the jury of "distinct qualities of
human nature," while holding that the exclusion of women from jury service does.
"[P]resumably doctors, lawyers, and other groups, whose frequent exemption from jury ser-
vice is endorsed by the majority, also offer qualities as distinct and important as those at
issue here."
30. 201 U.S. 638 (1906).
31. See note 37 infra.
32. 201 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
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This same view was echoed by the Supreme Court as late as 1975 in
Taylor.
The States are free to grant exemptions from jury service to individuals
... engaged in particular occupations the uninterrupted performance of
which is critical to the community's welfare. It would not appear that such
exemptions would pose substantial threats that the remaining pool of jurors
would not be representative of the community.'
Furthermore, the Court has never required that jury venires or master
lists totally represent all segments of the population within a community,
but only that they be "reasonably" or "fairly" representative.3 5
Thus, it seems that state statutes providing occupational exemptions
do not violate the fair cross-section principle established by the Supreme
Court. The standard is apparently more concerned with ensuring repre-
sentation of individuals possessing various physical traits and characteris-
tics, than with ensuring a representative jury in terms of occupation.
IV. TRADITIONAL JUSTICATIONS FOR EXEMPTING ATTORNEYS
Although Taylor did not specifically require that states rescind their
occupational exemptions, several states have voluntarily eliminated some
or all of the exemptions, s including the one for attorneys.37 Yet, in the
34. 419 U.S. at 534 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 538.
36. This voluntary action on the part of many states demonstrates an awareness that jury
lists should perhaps be broadened. Even before the Court handed down its most recent
interpretation of an impartial jury in Taylor, Congress passed the Federal Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1976). The Act provides that automatic ex-
emptions will be granted only for "(i) members in active service in the Armed Forces of the
United States; (ii) members of the fire or police departments of any State, district, territory,
possession, or subdivision thereof; and (iii) public officers in the executive, legislative, or
judicial branches of the Government of the United States, or any State, district, territory or
possession or subdivision thereof, who are actively engaged in the performance of official
duties." 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6). The Act also provides that groups of persons or occupa-
tional classes whose members shall on an individual basis request excuse, will be excused
only if the district court finds that jury service by such class or group would entail undue
hardship or extreme inconvenience to its members. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5).
37. The states which have eliminated the automatic exemption for attorneys as of this
writing are: ALA. CODE § 12-16-62 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-202 (1975); CAL. Civ.
PRO. CODE § 200 (West Supp. 1979); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-71-112 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
40.013 (West Supp. 1980); Idaho (no specific section); Indiana (no specific section); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 43-159 (1973); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29A-090 (Baldwin Cum. Issue 1979);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-209 (Repl. Vol. 1980); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 593.44
(West Cum. Supp. 1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1601(2) (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:69-2
(West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-2 (1978); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 512 (McKinney Cum. Supp.
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majority of states, attorneys still enjoy an automatic exemption. The pur-
pose of this exemption is unclear.
It seems that the traditional justification for occupational exemptions
in general was that some persons perform such vital services for the com-
munity that it would be wasteful to use their time as jurors.s8 This reason
seems more tenable for doctors or police officers than for attorneys. 9 The
availability of more than one source for legal services, seems to obviate
this justification. 40
Another explanation frequently proffered to justify exempting attor-
neys from jury service is that attorneys are imptiedly biased because of
their professional relationship with the judicial system. In Harrison v.
State,'1 the Indiana Supreme Court expressed a concern in having attor-
neys serve as jurors. "An attorney at raw is an officer of the Court...
and as such he is interested in, and an integral part of the judicial ma-
1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-6 (Repl. Vol. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-10 (Repl. Vol.
1974); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.12, .16 (Baldwin 1975); 1979 Or. Laws § 1, ch. 728 (effec-
tive July 1, 1980, repealing OR. REv. STAT. § 10.040 (1979)); 1977 Pa. Laws 202, No. 53, §
2(a) (repealing PA. STAT. ANN. tit.17, § 1333 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1980)); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2135 (Vernon 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-14 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 2.36.080 (Cum. Supp. 1980); W.VA. CODE § 52-1-2 (1966); Wyo. STAT. § 1-11-
103 (1977).
For a detailed chart of the specific occupational exemptions existing, as of 1977, in the
various states, see VAN DYKE at 272-79.
For an informative article on the impact of eliminating occupational exemptions in River-
side County, California see Brown, Eliminating Exemptions from Jury Duty: What Impact
Will It Have?, 62 Jun. 436 (1979). Mr. Brown concluded that the elimination of California's
statutory exemptions led to the inclusion of more than 120 citizens who otherwise would
have avoided jury duty.
38. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 534; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. at 640.
39. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically announced the standard by which
challenges to jury selection procedures will be reviewed, it is clear that mere "rational" rea-
sons will not be sufficient to justify excluding a distinctive class from jury service. In Taylor,
the Court recognized that a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is "fun-
damental to the American system of justice," and that "weightier reasons" must be ten-
dered if a distinctive class is to be excluded from service. 419 U.S. at 530, 534. The question
left unanswered is whether attorneys constitute a distinct class. See text accompanying
notes 26-29.
40. A fairly new juror management program which further erodes this traditional justifi-
cation is the one day/one trial jury system. This system requires a citizen to report for only
one day of jury duty unless he is selected to serve on a trial jury. For details of the system
and sources to contact see LEAA JUROR USAGE AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, CENTER FOR
JURY STUDIES, NEWSLETTER, (Nos. 1 & 6, 1979). The address of the Center for Jury Studies
is 6723 Whittier Ave., McLean, Va. 22101.
41. 231 Ind. 147, 106 N.E.2d 912 (1952).
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chinery which administers justice.""2 The court found that prejudicial er-
ror had not been committed when the lower court overruled appellant's
challenge to the array of jurors because attorneys were excluded. The
court noted that while attorneys are not public officials, they can be ex-
cluded on the same grounds; they may have a public interest in the case.43
Another court held attorneys to be impliedly biased because of the likeli-
hood that they will be acquainted with the attorneys involved in the case
and familiar with their professional reputations.44
Neither of these reasons seems to justify excluding attorneys, as a class,
from jury service. The proper concern should be whether an individual
prospective juror has any knowledge or biases about the particular trial,
including the facts and individuals involved in the case. Bias should not
be presumed from one's status. The general conclusion among commenta-
tors who have attempted to document the many factors affecting juror
behavior is that all jurors are inevitably biased, to some extent, due to
their personal and occupational experiences.' The voir dire examination
is the procedure by which individuals with extreme biases are eliminated
from jury service. Thus, as with other prospective jurors, a voir dire of
attorneys would expose any "damaging" biases held by the individual at-
torney-prospective juror.
A more important concern, however, seems to be the belief that attor-
neys will exert an unusual amount of influence over the other jurors be-
cause of their legal training. Although this may in fact be true, the auto-
matic exclusion of "licensed practicing attorneys" from jury service does
not alleviate this danger. The Virginia statutory exemption does not ap-
ply to those individuals who have had legal training but are not licensed
to practice law, or to those who have had legal training and are licensed
to practice law but are engaged in nonlegal occupation. The partial inclu-
sion of persons falling within these latter categories casts doubt on the
suggested rationale of the automatic exemption of "licensed practicing at-
torneys," since they have the ability, like "licensed practicing attorneys"
to exert the same type of influence over other jurors not so trained.
This is not to say that an amendment to the statute which would en-
compass these individuals would be appropriate. The possibility that at-
42. Id. at 158, 106 N.E.2d at 919.
43. Id. at 160, 106 N.E.2d at 919-20. See also Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 895 (1976).
44. Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 563, -, 327A.2d 375, 388 (1974).
45. For some of the more noted articles dealing with this issue see Broeder, Occupational
Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
1079 (1965); Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959);
Hermann, Occupations of Jurors as an Influence on Their Verdict, 5 F. 150 (1970).
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torneys may control jury deliberations should not be a unique concern. A
study"6 of 225 jurors serving in 23 jury trials within a single federal dis-
trict concluded generally that those jurors evincing special knowledge or
expertise, by virtue of their occupation in such fields as engineering,
medicine, or mechanical technology, for example, educated the other ju-
rors when the issues in the case related to their particular expertise. In
fact, in some of the cases documented, these experts were the only indi-
viduals on the panel who were able to understand the facts of the case,
the issues involved and the testimony given.
It is difficult to see how jurors can be insulated from the inevitable
influence of "experts" in the course of jury deliberations. The potential
for influence by an attorney-juror who may lecture other jurors on con-
cepts such as negligence or preponderance of the evidence, however, de-
serves no greater concern than the situation where an "expert" errone-
ously lectures fellow jurors on issues thought to be involved in the case.
In the instance where an individual attorney appears to be extremely
prosecution or defense oriented, he can be preemptorily challenged as any
other biased juror would be.4 7
V. THE RIGHT TO SERVE ON A JURY
Throughout this comment the occupational exemptions have been con-
sidered from the legislature's point of view. It is equally important, how-
ever, to view the situation from the perspective of the exempt individual.
While an attorney is not disqualified from serving on a jury solely by
virtue of his status, 5 the automatic exemption may infringe on his/her
right to be considered equally with all other citizens for jury service. In
Carter v. Jury Commission,'49 the Supreme Court, for the first time, per-
mitted citizens to challenge jury selection procedures on the ground that
they were systematically excluded from consideration as potential jurors.
In recognizing an individual's right to equal consideration in the selection
46. Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: A Prelimi-
nary Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1079 (1965).
47. Although the preemptory challenge may be used to eliminate prospective jurors who
may demonstrate a particular bias, at least two jurisdictions have held that such challenges
cannot be used to exclude prospective jurors solely by virtue of their membership in or
affiliation with a particular group in the community. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258,
583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, - Mass. -, 387 N.E.2d
499 (1979).
48. VA. ConE ANN. § 8.01-338 (Repl. Vol. 1977) specifies that persons adjudged legally or
mentally incompetent, convicted of treason or a felony, addicted to drugs or alcohol, of ad-
vanced age or impaired health shall be disqualified from serving as jurors.
49. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
1980]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of jurors, the Supreme Court said "[w]hether jury service be deemed a
right, a privilege, or a duty, the State may no more extend it to some of
its citizens and deny it to others .... "50
While this decision may indeed be a positive step toward broadening
jury lists, it must be recognized that Carter involved a discretionary se-
lection system; one in which appointed jury commissioners collected
names of prospective jurors through personal recommendations. Since the
discretionary method provides an opportunity for discrimination, the
Court will review such a system more rigorously than when jurors are se-
lected by a more random process. 51 Where a random selection process ex-
ists and the source list for prospective jurors is relatively standard, for
example, a voter registration list, it is difficult to establish a deliberate or
intentional act on the part of state officials to exclude individuals from
the master source list. Thus, the Court is less likely to interfere when
challenges are asserted against the random system.52 Although the Court
in Carter did not declare unconstitutional the discretionary system oper-
ating in Alabama, it did emphasize that if a state desires to use discre-
tionary criteria, it has an affirmative duty to seek out persons from all
sectors of the community 53
Whether Carter will be a basis for challenging an exclusion from jury
service in a random selection system remains to be seen.54 A potential
juror may rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Thiel to challenge a
blanket exemption in favor of establishing an individual determination of
availability to serve. In Thiel, the Court specifically held that
50. Id. at 330 (statement is based on a determination of racial discrimination).
51. See VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 49-50.
52. While attorneys are given a blanket exemption, they are not excluded because of a
racial, economic, religious or gender-based discriminatory motive. Any attorney wishing to
serve need only express his desire on the questionnaire he returns to the jury commissioner.
53. 396 U.S. at 331-40.
54. In Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973), the Virginia Supreme Court
entertained a somewhat similar question. Complainants challenged a Virginia statute pro-
viding an optional exemption for women responsible for the maintenance of children,
mental incompetents and those suffering physical impairments. Complainants, a man and
woman, qualified to serve as jurors and desirous of doing so, alleged that the exemption
discriminated against men in favor of women ancd therefore violated the United States and
Virginia constitutions. The Virginia Supreme Court held that despite the exemption, the
jury commissioner was able to insure a fair cross-section of the community and therefore the
exemption is constitutional. The court specifically said that "[a]ppellants are in no different
position than every eligible person in the county who desires to serve as a juror but has not
been called." Id. at 641.
This optional exemption still exists today, but it applies to "a person." VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-341.1 (Rep. Vol. 1977).
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"[r]ecognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service
are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an indi-
vidual rather than a group or class matter."55
Whether blanket exemptions should be eliminated in favor of an indi-
vidual grant of excuse by the court is debatable.58 Since the Carter deci-
sion, courts may be more apt to entertain the argument that each pro-
spective juror is entitled to equal consideration.5 7
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts and the majority of state legislatures have, until recently,
perpetuated the automatic exemption of attorneys from jury service. The
difficulty in articulating the rationale of the automatic exemption for at-
torneys, however, points out that indeed there may not be a valid justifi-
cation for such treatment. If Senator Emick proposes his bill in the 1981
session of the Virginia General Assembly, the Committee for Courts of
Justice should seriously consider whether the traditional reasons for ex-
empting attorneys from jury service are valid today.
Barbara Ann Dalvano
55. 328 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added).
56. One of the rationales for granting blanket exemptions is administrative convenience;
in many cases those individuals exempt would have been individually excused had they so
requested. It would seem that this justification should not work to vitiate the "right" to be
considered for jury service, or to dilute the representativeness of the jury. The Supreme
Court has so stated as much in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 535, at least where a large
cognizable class is involved. Yet, in Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973) the
Virginia Supreme Court recognized it was not irrational for the state legislature to consider
preferable a broad exemption over an individual excuse system, for purposes of administra-
tive convenience. Id. at 636, 194 S.E.2d at 709.
If blanket exemptions are to be eliminated in exchange for an individual excuse system,
uniform guidelines must be established to govern the circumstances in which excuses are to
be granted so that the already high percentage of excuses granted is not increased. See
CENTER FOR JURY STUDIES, METHODOLOGY MANUAL FOR JURY SYSTEMS (1980) for an outline
of suggestions to improve jury systems by eliminating exemptions and limiting the instances
for individual excuses.
57. One interesting initiative was taken by Joe Romanow, Jury Commissioner of Middle-
sex County, Massachusetts. Mr. Ramanow introduced the Juror's "Bill of Rights," which is
not a legal imperative, but serves to notify a juror of what he may expect from a well-
managed jury system. One such "right" is to be fairly selected by random procedure, as
opposed to purposeful selection, and to have the master list include all qualified jurors from
every occupation. Another "right" specifies freedom from exclusion on the basis of categori-
cal criteria. For other enumerated rights see LEAA JUROR USAGE AND MANAGEMENT PRO-
GRAM,CENTER FOR JURY STUDmS, NEwstmrR (No. 5, 1979).

